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The most basic characteristic of any government's budgetary process
is the way in which final decision—making responsibility is divided between
the political level and the bureaucratic level of government. At a suff 1—
ciently aggregate level of budgetary allocation, the politically responsible
agent decides the amount of expenditure in each broad category. In contrast,
at a more disaggregated level of the budgeting process, the political
authority decides only a total amount of expenditure and then delegates
responsibility for its allocation among subcategories to the bureaucracy.
The interesting econometric problem is to decide whether any given stage
inthe budget process is an example of the "political" or the "bureaucratic"
model. As far as we know, there has been no attempt to solve this type of
problem.
The current paper presents a method of deciding this question and then
uses it to study local government spending on education. The basis for our
*
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method is the important difference between the effect of intergovernmental
aidthatis implied by the political budget model and by the bureaucratic
budget model. According to the bureaucratic model, the effect of inter—
governmental aid on each category of educational input (e.g., teachers'
salaries, books, etc.) depends only on the change in total educational
spending induced by the aid and not on the type of aid that causes the
change in spending. In contrast, the political budget model implies that
the overall expenditure increase is the result of separate decisions on
each of the expenditure categories and that the changes in these expendi-
ture categories will depend on the form of the intergovernmental aid. Our
method of exploiting this difference is presented in detail below.
This difference in the way in which aid affects the allocation of
total educational spending gives potential policy significance to the
distinction between the political and bureaucratic models. State grants
to local school districts are already widely used to assure that all
districts, spend at least some specified minimum amountJ Courts in a
number of states have now ruled that further steps must be taken to reduce
the inequality among districts in educational spending or the correlation
between educational spending and local wealth.2 There is evidence that
1For a description of the current system of state block grants to
local districts, see Coons, Clone and Sugarman (1970).
2The California case of Serrano v. Priest was the first in a series
of cases on this point. After the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. San
Antonia held that educational spending inequality among income groups did
not violate the U.S. Constitution, a number of state courts have followed
California in interpreting the state constitutions to require a change
in educational finance.—3—
matching grants can be a powerful stimulus to local spending and therefore
that differential matching grants that are inversely correlated with wealth
can be a relatively effective offset to local differences in wealth.'
There is, however, no information about the pattern of extra spending
on the different categories of educational input that would be stimulated
by such matching grants. With a bureaucratic budget process, the additional
spending that results from matching grants would be spent in the same way
as any other increment to the school budget. This additional spending
would therefore satisfy the courts' mandate to offset the expenditure
effects of wealth differences. In contrast, with a political budget pro-
cess, the pattern of spending would depend on the price elasticities of
demand for each category of expenditure. The impact of a differential
matchinggrant when the budget process is "political" might therefore be
to stimulate spending in a way that fails to offset the expenditure effects
ofwealth, differences. These implications will be explored in detail below.
Thefirst section of this paper presents a formal statement of the
political and bureaucraticbudget models and discusses the likelihood ratio
test that we use to distinguish between them. Our data are described in
section 2 andtheestimates presented in section 3. The evidence over-
whelming supports the political budgeting model. A brief concluding
section comments on the implications of these results.
'See Feldstein (1975) for evidence on the effect of a differential
matching grant on educational spending. For a more general review of the
impact of governmental grants, see the important recent papers by Gramlich
(1976) and Inman (1977).—4—
1. Specification, Estimation and Test Procedure
The difference between the political and bureaucratic budgeting models
is equivalent to the distinction between a one—stage and a two-stage
budget process. According to the political budget model, the level of
expenditure on each category of educational input is decided simultaneously.
The bureaucratic model begins instead with a political (or higher level
bureaucratic) determination of total educational spending; this total is
then divided among the individual expenditure categories in a second stage.
Consider first the bureaucratic budgeting model. In specifying this
model, we assume only that the politically responsible authority selects
the total level of educational expenditure on the basis of prices, inter-
governmental aid and the economic and demographic attributes of the com-
munity. We shall not develop an explicit detivation of this demand function
in terms of utility maximization, median voter preferences, or any alterna-
tive theory of political choice.1 We write simply that
(1.1) T =Y'a+u
where T is the total expenditure on education in the school district, Y'
is the row vector of exogenous variables that determine expenditure, and u
is a random normal disturbance.
In the second stage o1 the process, the bureaucrats take this total
expenditure as their budget constraint and select expenditure levels for
1lnman (1977) provides a valuable discussion of these alternative
foundations for local government expenditure equations.—5—
each educational input type subject to this constraint. The individual
expenditures are therefore a function of this total education budget and
of a subset of the variables that influenced the political authority's
choice of this total spending level. The restriction to a subset is
important. Intergovernmental aid variables and the value of local taxable
property should influence the political choice of the total level of
spending but will not have a direct effect on how the educational budget
is spent.
To emphasize this we rewrite equation 1.1 with the exogenous variables
divided into the subset X that influences only total spending and the sub-
set Z that influences both total spending and the individual components:'
(1.2) T =X+Z'y+u.
With this notation, the second stage bureaucratic expenditure equations
can be written
(1.3) E. TX. + Z'ó. +v,
3 3 3 3
where is the expenditure on educational inputs of type j.
The political budgeting model implies that all of the individual
expenditures are decided simultaneously and therefore that all of the
exogenous variables are relevant for each expenditure decision. This
model can therefore be written:
(1.4) E=X's. + Z'y.+ u.,
j 3 3 3
I
1The specific variables in these two subsets will be discussed in the
next section.—6—
It is clear that the bureaucratic model is formally equivalent to the
political model subject to additional constraints on the relation among the
.'s in the different equation corresponding to different expenditure cate-
gories. More explicitly, the bureaucratic model implies that the K variables
affect each E. only through T and therefore that the .vectorsmust be
proportional to each other, i.e., must differ only by the proportionality
factor X. With this proportionality restriction, equations 1.2 and 1.3
imply that 1.4 is equivalent to:
(1.5) E. =X.(X')+ Z'y. + u..
A procedure developed by Goldberger(1974) and 1-lauser (1972) provides
a computationally efficient maximum likelihood method of estimating the
parameters of 1.5 and testing the restriction that the .vectorsare col—
linear.} We describe this canonical correlation procedure briefly, leaving
the interested reader to the original papers for the derivation of the
method as a maximum likelihood estimator. The procedure begins by "purging"
both the E. variables and the X variables of the effect of the variables
3
(Z) whose coefficients are unconstrained. We write FLfor the vector of
3 .z
residuals of the regression of on Z and Ez for the matrix of these and other
vectors, Similarly, we write K. for the matrix of residuals of the regres-
sion of X on Z. Let R =(X'.X.Z) 'X'.1 E.z, the matrix of regression
coefficients of E on K .LetU =E —KR, the matrix of residuals
•z •z
from these equations, and let S =U'U,the covariance matrix of these
1We are very grateful to Gary Chamberlain for suggesting this method
of estimation. We follow the Goldberger-Fhur procedure, ignoringthe
mixed cross—section and time—series structure of our data.—7—
residuals.Finally, let Q= V,E, —3,the covariance between the E;
variables and their predicted value X R. Goldberger and Ijauser show
thatthecharacteristic vector associated with the largest characteristic
root of the matrix QS1 is the maximum likelihood estimator of the vector
S of 1.5. Thus we solve
(1.6) (QS1 -pI)b—0
for the value of b associated with the largest value of v andhave found
themaximum likelihood estimate of 5 in 1.5. The vector of X's in 1.5
is then given by
(1.7) A =p1RS1b
where u is the largest characteristic root.
Before turning to the actual estimates, we describe the maximum likeli-
hood test of the restriction in 1.5. This test is based on the determinants
of the covariance matrices of the m's with and without the restriction.
J
More explicitly, let a,bethe covariance matrix of the residuals from the
unconstrained equations (1.4) and let XCi" be the corresponding matrix for
the constrained equations 1.5. The constraint implies that the determinant
of the latter matrix is at least as large as the determinant of the former.
Theusual asymptotic likelihood ratio test can be based on the fact that





where N is the number of observations used to estimate equations 1.4 and
1.5 and K is the number of parameter restrictions imposed in going from 1.4
to 1.5
The covariance matrix of the uj's for equations 1.4 is obtained directly
by estimating these equations by ordinary least squares and then using the
residuals to compute the covariance matrix i'. For equation 1.5, the
maximum likelihood estimates ofand the Xjs are used to calculate the
variables IL —X.X'; the regression of these derived variables on the Z's
J 3
yieldthe residuals that are used to calculate the covariance matrix G".—9—
2. Data and Specification
We have estimated the equations of the political and bureaucratic
budget models with data for 105 Massachusetts school districts. This section
describes the data and discusses the specification of the expenditure equa-
tions.
The school districts of Massachusetts are particularly suitable for
our analysis because of the prevailing system of intergovernmental grants.
More specifically, Massachusetts uses a system of differential matching grants
in which the matching rate is inversely related to local taxable property per
pupil. For the purpose of our analysis, we express the effect of the matching
rate in terms of the local district's implied price of educational spending:
P is the net cost to the local community per dollar of educational inputs
purchased. Although the basic principle of the Massachusetts aid formula
implies that the price variable is proportional to local taxable property
per pupil, a number of limits and "grandfather clauses" make the correlation
only 0. 42 in the most recent year in our sample. For those school districts
in which a constraint on the amount of aid makes the price equal to one (i.e.,
eliminates the matching aid), the state provides a block grant)
A further advantage of analyzing the Massachusetts experience is that
the current system of intergovernmental aid was only introduced in 1967.
Before that, towns received so—called "foundation" block grants designed to
insure a mimimum lSel of expenditure and to relieve local taxpayers of the
cost of providing that level of spending. Pooling data for several years
1The system of Massachusetts aid is described briefly in Feldstein
(1975) and more fully in Daniere (1969).—10—
to include both, the old foundation block grant period and thecurrent
matching grant period provides a source of variation in the price variable
that is completely uncorrelated with interdistrict differences intaxable
property per pupil.
Our sample consists of data for 105 school districts for seven fiscal
years: 1965, 1966, and 1970 through 1974. Piscal year 1974 was the most
recent year for what data could be obtained when our analysis began. The
three fiscal years in the middle of the sample decade are omitted because
disaggregated data on individual input categories is not available for
those years. The 105 school districts contain approximately 75percent of
the state population; the remaining districts were generally small andwere
excluded because data were not available for all the variablesor, for a
few districts, because of their relation to a regional school system.
Because of the polilical structure of Massachusetts, the 105 school dis-
tricts in our sample are coterminous with individual cities or towns.1
Previous studies of educational expenditure (e.g., Bahl and Saunders,
19.174; Peldstein, 1975 and 1977; Gramlich, 1976; Oates, 1974; Stern, 1973)
have identified a number of variables in addition to intergovernmental aid
that influence local expenditure on education. In describing these vari-
ables, it is useful to distinguish between the two classes of variables
that are relevant in the bureaucratic budget model: the X variables whose
The data used in the present study are thus an extension of thesample
used in Feldstein (1975) which included the sane 105 towns for only two
fiscal years and no disaggregation of spending into individual input cate-
gories.—11—
relative coefficients are constrained to be the same in all expenditure
equations and the Z variables whose coefficients are completely .unconMrained.
When there is an ambiguity in this assignment, we err on the conservative
side by including the variable in the unconstrained Z category. This
reduces the likelihood of rejecting the constraint and thus favors the
bureaucratic model. Since, as we indicated in the introduction, our evi-
dence leads us to reject the bureaucratic model in favor of the political
model, this classification procedure strengthens our conclusion.
The X group contains three variables that influence local expenditure
on education but which, once total educational spending was determined,
would not be expected to influence the bureaucracy's allocation of the
spending.1 These variables are (1) the price implied by the differential
matching grant, (2) the state block grant, and (3) the local taxable pro-
perty per pupil.2 Closely related to the third of these variables is the
fraction of the property value that is residential; a higher fraction of
residential property impoies that local voters will pay a higher fraction
of the tax revenue, rather than "exporting" it or seeing it capitalized in
industrial and commercial land values.3 We have included a measure of the
1The actual specification of our expenditure equations is nonlinear;
the X variables therefore include not only these three variables but also
non—linear cross—product terms. We return to this below.
2Taxable property per pupil is an estimated market value and not the
artificially low assessed value.
3me issue is complex because such "exporting" is limited by the long—
run mobility of capital and because the tax on residential rental property
may also be capitalized. Unfortunately, there is no data on the fraction
of taxable residential property that is rented rather than owner—occupied.—12—
the residential share of the tax base among the Z variables rather than
the X variables in order to allow for the possibility that a different
composition of local property is associated with differences in the social
class composition of the population or other factors that might influence
the pattern of educational spending.
The Z variablesare ofthree types:(1) measures of relevant economic
characteristicsof the student population; (2) features of the school dis-
trictitself; and (3) financial variables that should affect the composition
of educational spending. The economic characteristics of the student popu-
lation include the average family income in the district, theaverage number
of children per family, the percentage of children in the elementary grades,
and the percentage of children attending private or parochial schools. Two
important characteristics of the school district are included: the total
population size of the school district and the recent growth—rate of the
number of pupils.
A number of restricted block grants are provided to school districts
to pay for such things as transportation or services for low—income pupils.
A composite aggregate of such specific block grants is included among the
Z variables) As we noted above, the fraction of the local tax base
accounted for by residential property is also included among the Z vari-
ables. The final variable measures the cost of teaching staff relative to
Lpeldstem (1977) discusses the expenditure impact of the federalgrants
to local governments under the Title I program. Title I aid is not included
as a separate variable in the current study because the rates for distributing
such aid among local districts makes estimation impossible with data for a
single state.—13—
the cast of other educational inputs. This variable is constructed as
a weighted average of the consumer price index and of a statewide index
of teachers' salaries, reflecting the judgment that it is best to treat
intertown differences in teachers' salaries as indicating differences in
the quality chosen by the town.
Total current expenditure1 is divided by Massachusetts educational
accounting practice into 14 mutually exclusive categories:(1) teachers'
salaries; (2) textbooks; (3) library material and personnel; (4) audio-
visual material and personnel; (5) guidance services; (6) psychological
services; (7) educational television; (8) principals' offices; (9) super-
intendent's, office; (10) general administration; (11) community services;
(12) general non—instructional school services; (13) operation andmain-
tenance of the school plant; and (14) fixed charges assigned to the current
account. We define the corresponding F.. variables by converting each of
these expenditures to a per pupil amount and deflating to constant 1970
dollars.
In our estimation we have generalized the linear specifications of
section 1 to allow the impact of the matching rate price variable to depend
on the level of incomes and of taxable property value in the school district.
Equation 1.4 thus becomes
(2.1) = +2INC + + + S5JBG1 + Zj1 + U1
1capitalexpenditure is specifically excluded.—14-
where INC. is average family income in district i, V. is taxable property
value per pupil, BC. is the block grant per pupil and P. is the net cost
to the local community per dollar of educational expenditure. A time sub-
script on each variable is omitted for ease of presentation. The constrained
specification of equation 1.5 can be written:
(2.2) E.. = + 1321NC.+ V.]P. + 8V. + 5BC.}+ Z!y. + u...
Note that although the two equations are nonlinear in the X variables they
are linear in the parameters; the estimation and test procedure of section
1 is therefore directly applicable.—15—
3. The Likelihood Ratio Test and Individual Expenditure Elasticities
The likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects the bureaucratic
budget model in favor of the unconstrained political budget model. The
chi—square test statistic (i.e., minus twice the logarithm of the likeli-
hood ratio) is 172, substantially greater than the critical value of 80
for a one percent significance level with 52 degrees of freedom.'
A more detailed analysis of the actual coefficients shows that the
political budgeting model is not only statistically superior to the
bureaucratic model but also has substantially different implications about
the effects of matching grants and of district wealth differences.
Consider first how the models differ empirically in their implications
about the Impact of matching grants. A matching grant lowers the net price
to the school district per dollar of educational spending. The elasticity
of each type of educational spending with respect to this price is a useful
way of quantifying the difference between the political and bureaucratic
models. Because our specification does not assume a constant elasticity,
we shall evaluate all elasticities at the sample means of the variables.
No special problem is posed by the nonlinear specification of equation 2.1;
in the notation of that equation, we calculate the elasticity of E. with
respect to price P in the unconstrained political model as n. +
S2INC + 3.V)P/E. with all of the variables replaced by their mean values.
These elasticities and the estimated standard errors are shosin in column 2
1Qur sample contains 732 observations. The 14equations each contain
5 X variables; the restrictions thus reduce the number of parameters of
these variables from 70 to 18.—16—
TABLE1
Elasticities of Educational Spending with Respect to Price and
Local Property Value: A Comparison of Political and Bureaucratic Models
Elasticity with Respect to
Mean Price PrcnflttvY1iAe
Per Bureau— Bureau—
ExpenditureCategory Pupil PoliticalcraticPolitical cratic
Teachers $433.55 —0.53 —0.20 0.19 0.14
(0.09) (0.02)
Principal's Office 40.66 —0.27 —0.30 0.15 0.21
(0.15) (0.04)
Superintendent's Office 13.78 0.19 —1.11 0.43 0.77
(0.49) (0.12)
Text Books 8.40 0.26 —0.28 0.08 0.20
(0.30) (0.08)
Libraries 8.31 —0.36 -0.63 0.32 0.44
(0.35) (0.09)
Audiovisual 2.87 —0.63 —0.67 0.37 0.47
(0.47) (0.09)
Guidance Services 17.09 —0.51 —0.24 0.10 0.17
(0.25) (0.63)
Psychological Services 1.64 —0.21 —1.54 0.75 1.07
(1.10) (0.28)
Educational Television 0.22 0.63 0.40 —0.42 —0.28
(0.84) (0.21)
General Administration 19.49 —0.85 —0.51 0.40 0.36
(0.26) (0.07)
School Services 45.97 —0.91 —0.24 0.34 0.17
(0.20) (0.05)
Plant Operationand 83.36 —0.56 —0.40 0.33 0.28
Maintenance (0.15) (0.04)
Fixed Charges 4.35 —0.86 —0.63 0.39 0.44
(0.85) (0.21)
Community Services 2.90 —1.60 —0.06 0.33 0.04
(0.57) (0.14)
Standarderrors are shown in parentheses. See text for methods and definitions.—17—
of Table 1. The corresponding price elasticitiesin the constrained
bureaucratic model are calculated as =)tjS1 +S2INC + 3V)P/E; these
are shown in column 3 of Table 1.
Two general characteristics of the estimatedprice elasticities deserve
comment. First, there is substantial variationamong the individual price
elasticities of column 2. Although mostexpenditure categories have price
elasticities that differ significantly fromzero, a few do not. Second,
there are large differences between theunconstrained elasticities of the
political budgeting model and the constrained elasticitiesof the bureau-
cratic model. Even for a major category ofexpenditure like teachers'
salaries, the political budgeting model implies asubstantially larger
elasticity than the bureaucratic budgeting model.
A similar set of elasticities of expenditure withrespect to local
property value is shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1. Again, the
individual property value elasticitiesvary substantially among the expen-
diture categories and the estimates differnotably between the constrained
and unconstrained models.
More significant than either the price orproperty value elasticities
alone is the relation between them. The bureaucraticmodel implies that
the ratio of the price elasticity to theproperty value elasticity is the
same for every expenditure category;1 the evidence here indicatesthat the
'Under the bureaucraticmodel, the effects of price and value on each
expenditure can be decomposed into an effect on totalspending and an effect
of total spending on the individualcategory. It is easily shown that the
elasticity of with respect to price(n.) can be written as the product
of the elasticity of with respect to total spending and the
elasticity of total spending with respect to price Similarly, ri.=
'jTTv' Thus jpTv ='TpTv'
the same for all .—18—
ratio is 1.4. In contrast, the unconstrained estimates of the political
model imply very substantial differences in this ratio.
This variation in the ratio of the elasticities has important implica-
tions for the use of matching grants to offset the effects of interdistrict
differences in property values. As we noted above the landmark case of
Serrano v. Priest held that the system of educational finance must not make
local educational spending a function of local property values. Feldstein
(1975) showed how a formula relating the local matching grant rate to local
property value could achieve a zero elasticity of total expenditure per
pupil with respect to local property value per pupil. If the bureaucratic
model were true, this would also cause the corresponding elasticity for each
type of spending to equal zero. In contrast, the political budgeting model
and the estimates of Table 1 imply that no simple matching grant could make
all of the elasticities simultaneously equal to zero. A grant formula that
made the total spending elasticity equal to zero would leave the individual
estimates as functions of local property value. This casts serious doubt
on the general principle of trying to eliminate the effect of property value
on total spending. There are a number of alternative options: setting a
matching rate for a particular category like teachers' salaries, using
several different matching grants for different types of services, or
abandoning the goal of overall "wealth neutrality" in favor of establishing
minimum spending standards by category. The appropriate choice among these
options clearly lies beyond the scope of this paper.—19—
4. Conclusion
The evidence that we have examined shows quite clearly that the
categorical budgets of the Massachusetts school districts are determined
by a political process rather than by the bureaucracy of the school system.
The pattern of educational expenditure as well as its total is thus directly
responsive to the preferences of the electorate. For Massachusetts school
districts, the reality of the budgetary process appears to conform to the
constitutional description.
The extent to which such political control is characteristic of other
areas is currently unknown but is of substantial importance for understanding
theworking of the democratic process. We hope that the method that we have
presented here will be a useful tool for pursuing this question.—20--
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